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ABSTRACT
SOPHISTICATED CREDULITY: ARE OLD BELIEFS DISGUISED BY NEW
TERMINOLOGY AND SELECTIVE LEARNING?
By
Matthew A. Ramsey
University of New Hampshire, May, 2010
The present research attempted to distinguish between traditional anomalistic
belief (TAP) and pseudoscientific anomalistic belief (PSAP). In Study 1,1 constructed
the PSAP scale and then, to establish construct validity, examined its correlation to other
measures related to TAP. In Studies 2 and 3,1 examined how high and low TAP and
PSAP believers differed in recalling information that either did, or did not support the
existence of anomalistic phenomena. Participants read 12 abstracts on paranormal
phenomena and were given T/F recall questions either immediately (Study 2) or
following a four day delay period (Study 3). As expected, high and low PSAP believers
had generally similar recall accuracy. However, the results for high and low TAP
believers showed differences that were largely inconsistent with past research. In Study 4,
I constructed a regard for science scale which was negatively associated with TAP belief,
but not associated with PSAP belief. Changes to the methodology and proposals for
future research are discussed.
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CHAPTER I

ANOMALISTIC PHENOMENA

According to French (1992), no one factor underlies every aspect of paranormal
phenomena. That is, belief in ghosts, big foot, extrasensory phenomena (ESP), and
superstitions such as avoiding black cats (to name but a few examples) have varied
antecedents (e.g., personal experiences, deficiencies in probabilistic judgments). Clearly,
the belief that mental communication between two individuals is possible is quite
different from the belief that felines of a particular color portend bad luck. Yet, at a
fundamental level, both ideas are magical in nature and violate certain basic limiting
principles which are defined as self-evident or established by scientific consensus (e.g.,
an effect cannot precede its cause) (Broad, 1953).
Zusne and Jones (1989) attempted to solve the seemingly intractable problem of
grouping, on the one hand, very similar but, on the other hand, very different phenomena
by terming all phenomena which seem to deal with the paranormal, supernatural, occult,
and superstition as "anomalistic" (p. 2). Essentially, anomalistic phenomena are that
which, if real, violate current scientific consensus (Wiseman & Watt, 2006). By defining
such phenomena in this way, the possibility of reclassifying phenomena previously
labeled as anomalistic is contingent upon new scientific discoveries. This definition will
suffice for the present paper, and terms such as occult, superstition, magic, and
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paranormal should all be understood as describing a system of thinking that can be
succinctly classified as anomalistic.
For decades researchers have reported that, despite increases in scientific
education, belief in anomalistic phenomena is pervasive and on the rise (Coll & Taylor,
2004; Cromer, 1993; Martin, 1994; Russell & Jones, 1980; Shermer, 2003). The literature
suggests that such widespread belief is present in the United States as well as Great
Britain and other parts of the world (Auton, Pope & Seeger, 2003; "Belief in
Pseudoscience," 2002; Benassi, Singer & Reynolds, 1980; Gallup & Newport, 1991;
Haraldsson, 1985; Jaroff, 1995; Newport & Strausberg, 2001; Sparks & Miller, 2001;
Saenko, 2005). Indeed, the rise in popularity of cryptozoology (the study of creatures
such as the Loch Ness monster, Sasquatch, etc.), psi phenomena (telepathy, ESP,
clairvoyance), unidentified flying objects (UFOs), and the healing power of crystals (to
name but a few) strongly suggests that, despite all of our scientific achievements, we are
living in a superstitious age (Yates & Chandler, 2000).
The conflict between scientific and anomalistic modes of thinking is largely
predicated on the concept of causality. In the former mode, events can only be influenced
by observable and testable antecedents via observable and testable causal action. In the
latter mode, however, supposed causality does not operate via methods that are supported
by modern scientific evidence. For example, throwing salt over one's shoulder is thought
by some to portend good luck. There is cause (throwing salt) and effect (good luck) but
no rationally supported mechanism relates the two. Further, there is a lack of a reliable
association between salt throwing and luck. What goes up must always come down (due
to observable and reliable gravitational forces on earth). However, even the most
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superstitious among us would probably not claim that salt is always a reliable harbinger
of good fortune.
How Are Anomalistic Beliefs Perpetuated?
How, despite the current level of scientific understanding, is this general
propensity to believe in unfounded claims (this credulity) perpetuated? Research
indicates that many peoples' anomalistic beliefs come from the media and personal
experiences (see Singer & Benassi 1981). As of this writing, a brief glance at the
programming schedule of several major television networks (ABC, NBC, CBS and FOX)
reveals over a half-dozen shows that regularly involve telekinesis, clairvoyance, mindreading, levitation, demons, ghosts, cryptozology, time-travel, aliens, magic and
generally bad, or misrepresented, science (see also Frutkin, 2008; Sparks & Miller,
2001). However, one may question whether the anomalistic beliefs of adults are
influenced by programs that are meant solely for entertainment purposes. Singer and
Benassi (1981) asked participants to identify the sources of their anomalistic beliefs and,
perhaps surprisingly, some individuals listed "scientific media." When questioned
further, publications such as National Enquirer and Reader's Digest and "documentaries"
such as the pro-occult In Search of... (a weekly television series which aired from 1976
to 1982), were cited as credible scientific sources. Today, Discovery Channel, a
supposedly informative and reputable network, airs programs like Ghost Lab and A
Haunting, the latter claiming to "[chronical] the terrifying true stories of the
paranormal..." (Discovery Channel, 2009). Perhaps surprisingly, even the Animal Planet
channel has programming dedicated to the realm of the paranormal and its relation to
animals (Animal Planet, 2010). Although it would be difficult to argue that a single half-
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hour sci-fi drama could strongly influence skeptical adults, the media's generally
uncritical view of the occult may serve to perpetuate belief (Sparks & Miller, 2001).
However anomalistic beliefs come about, they are pervasive and persistent.
Benassi, Singer, and Reynolds (1980) sought to evaluate the effect of prior belief on the
witnessing of a performer described as an amateur psychic, a magician, or a magician
who would be performing tricks that only gave him the appearance of being a genuine
psychic. This latter condition was so worded in order to strongly bias viewers against the
possibility that the performer had authentic powers. In Experiment 1, after viewing the
performance participants were asked whether they thought the performer was genuinely
psychic. Although the researchers checked to insure that the participants understood the
difference between the word "magic" (a term suggesting mere stage trickery) and
"psychic" (a term suggesting authentic paranormal powers), in all conditions a majority
believed him to be authentically psychic and only 14% of participants in the psychic
condition believed that he was not authentic. In Experiment 2, participants read a detailed
description of the performer's demonstration and 59% reported that he was likely to be
psychic. Participants were further asked if nonpsychic magicians could do the same feats
as the performer and the majority agreed that they could (two participants denied that
magicians could produce the same feats). They were then asked to estimate how many of
those who performed these same feats were not authentic. Participants reported that the
vast majority were likely to not be authentic. Finally, they were asked to reevaluate the
performance and report whether they still believed that the individual was psychic.
Despite the acknowledgement that nonpsychics could perform the same demonstrations
with trickery and despite the acknowledgement that the vast majority of those claiming
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psychic ability were likely to be fakes, 52% of participants persisted in their belief that
the man was an authentic psychic (Benassi et al., 1980).
Individuals seem to be able to easily switch between anomalistic belief and
rational thought depending on whether control can be achieved through conventional
means or not (Singer & Benassi, 1981). For example, astrological beliefs increased in the
years of the Depression in the US (Sales, 1973) and the practice of water dowsing is more
prevalent in places where water is hard to find (Vogt & Hyman, 1959). The argument that
uncertainty is a fertile breeding ground for superstition and occult belief is entirely
consist with the current economic crisis and the concurrent rise in visits to psychics
(NBC.com, 2009; Singel, 2008).
Although the media endorses uncritical acceptance of paranormal phenomena,
Singer and Benassi (1981) argued that centers of education should include the study of
the paranormal in their curriculum in order to teach students to evaluate critically such
claims. There seem to be barriers to addressing this need, however, as some scientists and
educators may feel it beneath them to address the claims of occult proponents. Others
may be worried that teaching students about the paranormal may, in fact, cause an
increase in belief and further exacerbate the problem. Martin (1994) pointed out that this
fear seems reminiscent of the opposition to the subject of communism being taught in
schools which was based on the premise that students may have seen it as an
endorsement of that system. In the early 1900s, research on anomalistic belief posited
that increased instruction in the sciences would address what was seen as the natural
consequence of a deficiency in education (Zusne & Jones, 1989). More recent research
suggests that the proposed solution was somewhat naive (Coll & Taylor, 2004; Saenko,
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2005; Walker, Hoekstra, & Vogl, 2002; Zusne & Jones, 1989). In other words, for such
beliefs to be effectively countered, the sentiment now seems to be that courses should be
designed specifically to address them (e.g., Benassi & Goldstein, 2005; Jones & Zusne,
1981; Zapf, 1945).
Some Equivocal Findings
When researchers discuss the "muddy waters" of paranormal belief and
superstition they are referring to the fact that it is difficult to achieve consensus on the
individual variables that constitute said belief (Irwin, 1993; Vyse, 1997). For example,
some studies show gender differences (Gray, 1990; Williams, Francis & Robins, 2007),
while others do not (Gray & Mill, 1990; Rogers, Davis & Fisk, 2009). Some might be
inclined to think that people with deep religious beliefs also hold other paranormal or
superstitious beliefs, but this is typically not the case. In fact, those endorsing
fundamentalist beliefs (e.g., God and the devil exist, the miracles in the Bible actually
happened) are less likely to report belief in typical psi phenomenon and this effect is even
stronger in those who regularly attend church services (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007;
Bainbridge, 2004; Smith & Simmonds, 2006).
Deficiencies in human reasoning have been well documented (e.g., Allan &
Jenkins, 1980; Ward & Jenkins, 1965; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1983) and a fundamental assumption concerning believers and skeptics is that
they differ in cognitive functioning in general (Wiseman & Watt, 2006). Although
researchers sometimes find that lower levels of superstition is associated with increasing
levels of education (Messer & Griggs, 1989; Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002; Preece &
Baxter, 2000), this is not always true (Coll & Taylor, 2004; Tart, Putoff & Targ, 1979;

7

Tobacyk, Miller, & Jones, 1984; Sparks, Hansen & Shaw, 1994; Vyse, 1997; Zusne &
Jones, 1989). Sparks et al. (1994) found that among Purdue University students 70%
believed in the existence of ghosts, 40% in the accuracy of palm reading, 37% in the
accuracy of psychics, and 44% in the ability to occasionally use ESP, suggesting that
even those with some college education are susceptible to anomalistic belief.
Although those with training in the humanities sometimes exhibit higher levels of
anomalistic belief than those with training in the sciences (Otis & Alcock, 1982; Padgett,
Benassi, & Singer, 1981), Coll and Taylor (2004) interviewed 18 scientists who were
currently practicing a range of disciplines (physics, chemistry, geology, etc.) and asked
them to indicate the extent to which they believed in things such as the ability for a
broken mirrors to bring bad luck, the likelihood of aliens having visited our planet, and
the reality of ghosts and ESP. Many were skeptical of what they considered to be "just
superstitions" (p. 766; e.g., the number 13 is unlucky); however, the majority entertained
the possibility of various phenomena such as aliens and ghosts, citing probability (i.e., the
number of planets in our universe is such that it is likely that some have life) and personal
experiences as reasons for their belief (see also McClenon, 1982).
Some studies have examined differences in academic performance and show
variously that skeptics outperform believers (Messer & Griggs, 1989; Otis & Alcock,
1982; Pasachoff, Cohen, & Pasachoff, 1970), skeptics and believers perform equally
(Thalbourne & Nofi, 1997), and that believers outperform skeptics (Emmons & Sobal,
1981; Haraldsson, 1985; Tobacyk, Miller, & Jones, 1984). Others have examined
possible differences based on intelligence tests and have arrived at the same mixed results
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(Jones, Russell, and Nickel 1977; Smith, Foster, & Stoven, 1998; Thalbourne & Nofi,
1997; Wiseman & Watt, 2002).
Perhaps a better way to assess the question of whether cognitive abilities are a
distinguishing feature between skeptics and believers would be to examine how
intelligence and training is applied to tests of critical thinking. Believers may be just as
smart as skeptics, but may tend to use their intelligence in uncritical ways. Unfortunately,
this work has also been inconclusive with some studies showing that disbelievers
outperform believers (Alcock & Otis, 1980), whereas others have not replicated that
finding (Royalty, 1995).
A Few Consistent Findings
Despite the inconsistency of results across studies, there do seem to be some
consistent findings. Anomalistic belief has been associated with individual differences in
rationality/emotionality, tolerance for ambiguity, locus of control orientation, and
depressive symptoms such that believers are higher in emotionality, less tolerant of
ambiguity, exhibit an external locus of control orientation, and show more symptoms of
depression (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006; Groth-Marnat &
Pegden, 1998). It could be that some individuals, who are otherwise intelligent and
mentally healthy, hold certain paranormal beliefs that they explain by using
pseudoscientific terminology—that is, terminology used in science and misapplied to
phenomena generally agreed to be unfounded by rigorous scientific investigation (Coll &
Taylor, 2004; Shermer, 2003; Tart, Puthoff & Targ, 1979; Wargo, 2008; Zusne & Jones,
1989). It may, in part, be this distinction that serves to "muddy the waters." These
individuals may possess a kind of sophisticated credulity—a belief that anomalistic
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phenomena actually have causal (as opposed to magical) properties that science has yet to
account for (Leeds & Murphy, 1980). Instead of professing belief in magic (an
unsophisticated and outdated belief system), these believers may point to our continuing
ignorance of the fundamental laws of nature (indeed, the nascent science of quantum
mechanics is often cited) to support their claims which, objectively, are unsupported by
scientific consensus (Tart, Putoff & Targ, 1979).
Pseudoscientific Belief
Increasingly, breakthroughs in science seem like stories of magic and mysticism.
For example, scientists have recently "teleported" data from one atom to another over a
space of approximately one meter, without said data passing through any form of
physical medium (LiveScience.com, 2009). Even scientific breakthroughs that are
decades old are largely not understood by most people (e.g., how does electricity actually
work?). In fact, French (1992) argued that although no convincing evidence in support of
paranormal phenomena exists, there are no reasons why some such phenomena could not,
in principle, occur. For the average person it might be difficult, and may even seem
presumptuous, to distinguish between scientifically plausible and implausible ideas.
Little to no research has examined possible differences between these two types
of believers (i.e., believers in traditional anomalistic phenomena [TAP] and believers in
pseudoscientific anomalistic phenomena [PSAP]). Several scales measure belief in TAP,
and no scales that measure belief in PSAP. In Study 11 developed a scale that measured
belief in PSAP. Next, to evaluate the validity of the scale, I examined whether believers
in PSAP and TAP differ from each other in terms of other measures of personality. In
Studies 2 and 3 I examined whether TAP and PSAP believers differ in their ability to
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recall accurately information that either supports or does not support the existence of
paranormal phenomena. Finally, in Study 4 I examined whether TAP and PSAP believers
differ in their general support and enthusiasm of science.

CHAPTER II

STUDY 1

Consistent with past research (as cited above), I hypothesized that individuals
with higher belief in TAP would be higher in emotionality (and lower in rationality), less
tolerant of ambiguity, higher in belief in good luck, have an external locus of control, and
have higher levels of depression relative to those with lower belief. However, I
hypothesized that I would not find these relationships (or, such relationships would be
attenuated) in individuals who are higher in PSAP belief. In other words, individuals who
hold strong beliefs in PSAP may not show strong differences (on the measures previously
mentioned) from those who are low believers. This may be because, although they share
a belief in the paranormal with TAP believers, they take a fundamentally different (more
rational) approach to such phenomena.
Method
Participants
Participants were 183 undergraduate psychology students (56 male, 126 female,
one person did not indicate sex) enrolled in introductory psychology courses at a public
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university in the northeastern United States participated in the study as part of a course
requirement. The mean age of the participants was 19 (SD - 2).
Procedure
Participants completed an online survey consisting of several measures.
Participants completed the same measures except that some (n = 89) completed a
shortened version of Tobacyk's (1988) Revised Paranormal Belief scale (RPB) [TAP
condition] and others (n = 94) completed a scale in which I reworded Tobacyk's items to
include scientific terminology (e.g., I replaced "magic" with "energy") [PSAP condition].
Participants were randomly assigned to each of the groups. Appendix A contains all of
the TAP items and Appendix B contains all of the PSAP items used in the present study.
Measures
Paranormal belief was measured using either a shortened measure of the RPB or
the measure in which I reworded the items. Each of these versions consists of 16-items
and includes a 7-point rating scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). An
example of the original RPB is: "Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel (astral
projection)." An example of the reworded RPB is: "It is possible to focus your energy
such that your consciousness can leave your body and travel."
Self-esteem was assessed with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale (RSE)
(Rosenberg, 1965). This measure consists of 10-items and includes a 4-point rating scale
(1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree). An example item is: "On the whole, I am
satisfied with myself."
Depressive symptoms were assessed with the Center for Epidemiological Studies
Depression Scale (CESD) (Radloff, 1977). This measure consists of 20-items that ask
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about experiences that have occurred during the past week and includes a 4-point rating
scale (0 = rarely or none of the time, 3 = all of the time). An example item is: "I was
bothered by things that usually don't bother me."
Analytical and intuitive thinking was assessed with the Rational-Experiential
Inventory (REI) (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). This inventory consists of two 20-item scales,
Rationality (Ratal) and Experientiality (Exp), and includes a 5-point rating scale (1 =
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Example items include: "I am much better at
figuring things out logically than most people" (rational or analytical thinking) and "I
often go by instincts when deciding on a course of action" (experiential or intuitive
thinking).
Belief in luck was assessed with the Belief in Good Luck scale (BIGL) (Darke &
Freedman, 1997). I used a shortened form of the original scale, dropping items that did
not specifically mention the word luck. This shortened form consists of 10-items and
includes a 6-point rating scale (1= strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree). An example
item is: "I often feel like it's my lucky day."
Tolerance for ambiguity was assessed with the scale of Tolerance-Intolerance of
Ambiguity (TIA) (Budner, 1978). This measure consists of 16-items and uses a 7-point
rating scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). An example item is: "An expert
who doesn't come up with a definitive answer probably doesn't know too much."
Locus of control was assessed with Levenson's Locus of Control scale (LLOC)
(Levenson, 1973). Levenson's scale is made up of three subscales consisting of
internality (Intrnl), chance (Chnce), and powerful others (Powful). Each subscale consists
of 8-items and uses a 6-point rating scale (-3 = disagree strongly, +3 = agree strongly).
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Example items include: "Whether or not I get to be a leader depends mostly on my
ability" (internal), "Whether or not I get into a car accident is mostly a matter of luck"
(chance), and "Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me" (powerful
others).
Participants were also asked about their level of education, age, ethnicity, gender,
and GPA.
Results
Traditional Anomalistic Phenomena
I used the casewise diagnostics option under linear regression to identify outliers
that were two standard deviations from the mean. After removing five participants,
analyses were conducted for 84 participants. Belief in TAP was significantly correlated
with CESD, r = .18,/? = .05; Rami, r = -.29,/? = .004; Exp, r = .25,p = .01; Chnce, r =
.18,/? = .05. TAP had a Cronbach alpha of .80. Table 1 provides the full correlation
matrix.
The overall multiple regression to predict TAP from BIGL, TLA, RSE, CESD,
Ratnl, Exp, and the subscales of LLOC was statistically significant, F(9,74) = 2.9,/? =
.005, R = .26. When controlling for all other predictors, Ratnl significantly predicted
TAP, r(74) = -2.39,/? = .02, sr 2 = .06. In other words, individuals who scored highly on
belief in TAP were more likely to be lower in rational thinking. Additionally, when
controlling for all other predictors, Exp significantly predicted TAP, t(74) = 3.39,/? =
.001, sr2 = .11. In other words, individuals who scored highly on belief in TAP were
more likely to be higher in emotional thinking. Table 2 provides the individual betas and
SE for each predictor.
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Pseudoscientific Paranormal Phenomena
I used the casewise diagnostics option under linear regression to identity outliers
that were two standard deviationsfromthe mean. After removing three participants,
analyses were conducted for 91 participants. Belief in PSAP was significantly correlated
with BIGL, r = .20, p = .03; Exp, r = .34,/; = .001, and the chance subscale of LLOC, r =
.41, p < .001. PSAP was marginally correlated with TIA, r = .16, p = .06. PSAP had a
Cronbach alpha of .80. Table 1 provides the full correlation matrix.
The overall multiple regression to predict PSAPfromBIGL, TIA, RSE, CESD,
Ratal, Exp, and the subscales of LLOC (chance, internal, powerful others) was
significant, F(9, 81) = 5.17, p < .001, R2 = .37. When controlling for all other predictor
variables, TIA significantly predicted PSAP, f(81) = 2.36,p = .02, sr2 = .04. That is,
higher tolerance for ambiguity was associated with higher levels of PSAP belief. When
controlling for all other predictor variables, Exp significantly predicted PSAP, f(81) =
2.60,p = .01, sr = .05. That is, higher levels of experientiality (relying on one's instincts)
were associated with higher levels of PSAP belief. When controlling for all other
predictor variables, the chance subscale of LLOC significantly predicted PSAP, ?(81) =
3.55, p = .001, sr2 = .10, which suggests that higher levels of the belief that one's life is
largely governed by chance (and not by oneself) were associated with higher levels of
PSAP belief. Finally, when controlling for all other predictor variables, Intrnl marginally
predicted PSAP, t(Sl) = 1.90,p = .06, sr2 = .03. In other words, a more internal locus of
control orientation was marginally associated with higher levels of PSAP belief. Table 2
provides the individual betas and SE for each predictor.
Discussion
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Consistent with past research, higher belief in TAP was correlated with higher
depressive symptoms, lower rationality, and higher experientiality (Aarnio & Lindeman,
2007; French, 1992; Rice, 2003; Wolfradt, Oubaid, Straube, Bischoff & Mischo, 1999;
Vyse, 1997). Also, consistent with past research (see Vyse, 1997), the rest of the picture
was not as straightforward. I did not find relationships between higher belief in TAP and
higher belief in luck, lower tolerance for ambiguity and a generally external locus of
control. Further, although present, the distinction between TAP and PSAP belief is
somewhat unclear. As predicted, higher belief in PSAP was related to higher tolerance of
ambiguity. Belief in PSAP was not correlated with rational thinking, thus further
distinguishing itself from TAP belief (which was negatively correlated with rational
thinking). However, my hypothesis would have been better supported if PSAP was
positively correlated with rationality. Finally, higher belief in PSAP was related to higher
belief in chance and higher reliance on "gut feelings" (experientiality) relative to those
with lower PSAP belief. Both of these findings were contrary to my hypotheses.
Clearly, TAP and PSAP beliefs share similarities in that they are both concerned
with anomalistic belief and, considering the dearth of evidence supporting the existence
of such phenomena, it may not be surprising that both sets of believers are higher in their
general reliance on "gut feelings" relative to low believers. The fact that TAP believers
are significantly more likely to be low in rationality whereas PSAP believers are not may
point to a fundamental difference between those two belief sets. I suspect that believers in
TAP and PSAP have arrived at their respective beliefs via different routes (e.g., selective
learning). If this is the case, they may exhibit differences in recall accuracy when given a
memory task concerning anomalistic phenomena.
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CHAPTER III

STUDY 2

The selective learning hypothesis suggests that one can continue to hold on to a
particular belief in the face of disconfirming information if one simply disregards said
information (Jones & Russell, 1980). The effect that prior beliefs and attitudes have on
information retention has been examined in the context of pro- and anti-Communist
sentiments (Levine & Murphy, 1943), racial segregation issues (Jones & Aneshansel,
1956; Jones & Kohler, 1958), pleasantness of particular words (Laird, 1923),
controversial gender issues (Alper & Korchin, 1952) and more recently, paranormal
phenomena (Jones & Russell, 1980; Russell & Jones, 1980; Wiseman & Morris, 1995).
The literature regarding this more recent focus suggests differential information retention
(i.e., selective learning) in those high in paranormal belief compared with those low in
paranormal belief (Jones & Russell, 1980; Russell & Jones, 1980; Wiseman & Morris,
1995).
Russell and Jones (1980) identified participants as either high or low believers in
paranormal phenomena and randomly assigned them to read an abstract that either did or
did not support the existence of ESP. After reading the abstract, participants rated their
levels of anxiety, hostility and depression and then completed a 15-item recall test.
Accurate recall was negatively correlated with a high degree of paranormal belief when
the abstract did not support the existence of ESP. In other words, individuals who were
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identified as believers were less likely to be accurate than those identified as skeptics.
Indeed, half of the believers reversed the author's conclusion that ESP was not supported.
The authors argued that this result suggested a selective learning effect. Further, although
both believers and skeptics reported experiencing emotional distress when exposed to
counter-attitudinal information, this effect was particularly strong in believers. In a
follow-up study, Jones and Russell (1980) sought to extend theirfindingsby "directly
measuring responses to belief-discrepant and belief-consistent demonstration[s] of ESP"
(p. 309). Participants who were either high or low in paranormal belief saw a live
demonstration where an experimenter attempted to guess which card was being held by
his assistant. The demonstration either supported the existence of ESP (the psychic had a
60% accuracy rate) or did not support the existence of ESP (the psychic had a 20%, or
chance, accuracy rate). When the demonstration was rigged to support ESP both skeptics
and believers reported that ESP had occurred. However, when the demonstration was
rigged to not support ESP some believers reported that ESP occurred whereas skeptics
did not. This difference occurred even though participants were explicitly informed that a
20% accuracy rate should not be regarded as evidence of ESP.
Participants were then asked to guess the outcome of the cards (taking on the role
previously held by the experimenter) and report, on a 7-point scale, their supposed
personal level of ESP (i.e., their rate of success). Jones and Russell (1980) failed tofinda
significant occurrence of ESP in either believers or skeptics. However, analyses indicated
that for skeptics, card guessing performance and self-reported ESP ability ratings were
significantly correlated (that is, skeptics' low performance in card guessing correlated
with their low self-reported ESP ability ratings), whereas for believers, the correlation
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was nonsignificant (that is, believers did not differ from skeptics in their low card
guessing performance but they believed that they did well).
Clearly, there is a difference between believers and skeptics such that believers
are unable or unwilling to report outcomes that are inconsistent with their previously held
beliefs (e.g., that ESP failed to occur), whereas skeptics are. The question remains, at
what level is the distortion? That is, do believers fail to encode and store discrepant
information properly; do they encode such information properly but fail to retrieve it; or
do they exhibit a bias in reporting? Wiseman and Morris (1995) conducted two studies
designed to explore these questions.
In Experiment 1, believers and skeptics viewed a taped demonstration of a
magician who preformed an ESP trick (cards were guessed from a deck) and a
psychokinesis trick (a fork was bent by gently stroking it). After the demonstrations
participants were asked eight recall questions consisting of relevant ("The cutlery was
touched by the psychic before the fork demonstration began") and irrelevant ("At the end
of the demonstration, the psychic returned any unbent cutlery to the pile") probes (p.
116). Once the recall period was complete, participants were explicitly told that the
demonstrations were not authentic and were then asked to complete a second set of eight
recall questions consisting of important and unimportant probes. Wiseman and Morris
(1995) found that after the first round of recall questions, skeptics recalled significantly
more important information than believers but that there was no significant differences
between groups after the second round of recall questions.
Additionally, there was no difference between groups in recall of unimportant
items after either round. This finding supports the hypothesis that believers properly
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encode and store attitude-discrepant information but that their biases lead them to deem
this information as unimportant. The author's argued that believers and skeptics assign
different levels of importance to information and, in the absence of strongly
disconfirming evidence, they show differential retrieval. As a result of the disclosure that
the demonstrations were not authentic, believers improved in their recall to the extent that
they were still able to recall correctly the important information (Wiseman & Morris,
1995). The authors argued that the ability to retrieve information that had been encoded,
but labeled 'unimportant,' is limited by time. According to the authors (Experiment 2), in
order to give information deemed unimportant a chance to decay, they asked participants
to write down explanations of the tricks before giving them the recall questions. They
report that this delay was enough to block believer's access to information that had
previously been deemed unimportant. That is, during the first recall period, skeptics
recalled more important information than did believers (this finding was consistent with
Experiment 1) and after being told the demonstrations were not authentic, this difference
in recall persisted. These findings were consistent with Greenwald and Sakumura (1967)
who predicted that learning and retention of attitude-relevant information will occur only
when the information is consistent with the previously held attitude.
I hypothesize that, consistent with the findings of Russell and Jones (1980),
higher belief in TAP will be associated with less accurate reporting when the abstract
does not support the existence of paranormal phenomena (i.e., the information presented
in the abstract is discrepant with the previously held attitude). Further, because I argue
that individuals who possess higher belief in PSAP are more objective and rational than
individuals who are higher in TAP belief, they will be accurate in reporting the outcome

of the abstract regardless of whether or not the information is discrepant with their
previously held attitude. In other words, I expect to find a difference between TAP and
PSAP believers such that those high in PSAP belief should have accuracy scores similar
to low believers in TAP and PSAP.
Method
Participants
Participants were 78 undergraduate psychology students (9 male, 69 female)
enrolled in introductory psychology courses at a public university in the northeastern
United States. The mean age of participants was 19.2 (SD = 1.2).
Procedure and Measures
At Time 1, participants completed the same scales and demographic information
described in Study 1. The only difference was that all participants completed both
versions of the RPB. The order in which participants received either the TAP or PSAP
measure was counterbalanced. Four days later (Time 2), participants read twelve bogus
research abstracts that either did or did not support the existence of anomalistic
phenomena (e.g., poltergeists, astrology, aliens) (cf. Russell & Jones, 1980). The
abstracts are presented in Appendix C. Participants then answered several true/false
questions about each abstract. The questions are presented in Appendix D. The critical
question (dependent variable) required participants to indicate whether the abstract
supported the existence of anomalistic phenomena (e.g., Alien bodies were not removed
for testing, thus disproving that there was paranormal activity) whereas non-critical
questions (filler items) asked about details given in each abstract (e.g., The religious
revival in Egryn, Wales occurred in 1905). Abstracts were presented in two different
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orders so that half of the participants read Abstract 1 to Abstract 12 sequentially (order
one) and half read Abstract 12 to Abstract 1 sequentially (order two). Of the 12 abstracts,
six supported the existence of anomalistic phenomena. For each order (one and two) I
created two subsets (four subsets in total) in which I counterbalanced whether an abstract
supported anomalistic activity so that, for example, half of the participants reading the
Roswell account were told that alien bodies were removed for testing and half were told
that there were no alien bodies. Finally, participants completed the dependent variables in
the order that they read the abstracts. For each of the four subsets I counterbalanced
whether the critical question was worded in the affirmative (e.g., The authors concluded
that there was support for the claim that ESP exists) or in the negative (e.g., The authors
concluded that there was no support for the claim that ESP exists). By using these
methods it is possible to examine whether a bias exists such that individuals are more
likely to answer in the affirmative regardless of what the abstract actually reported (see
Wiseman & Morris, 1995).
Dependent Variables
There were four types of critical questions: 1) questions about abstracts that
supported anomalistic phenomena in which the correct answer was "true," [True Sup] 2)
questions about abstracts that supported anomalistic phenomena in which the correct
answer was "false," [False Sup] 3) questions about abstracts that did not support
anomalistic phenomena in which the correct answer was "true," [True NoSup] and 4)
questions about abstracts that did not support anomalistic phenomena in which the correct
answer was "false" [False NoSup]. Each type of question appeared three times so that, for
any given question type, a participant could get a maximum of three points.
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Results
The correlation between TAP and PSAP was r = .89,/? < .001. The TAP and
PSAP had Cronbach Alphas of .85 and .89, respectively.
I examined participants who fell in the lower (a score of 47 or lower) and upper (a
score of 68 or higher) quartiles of TAP and the lower (a score of 48 or lower) and upper
(a score of 68 or higher) quartiles of PSAP in order to obtain clearer differences between
low and high believers.
Traditional Anomalistic Phenomena
A mixed ANOVA examined the accuracy of participant responses on abstracts
that either did or did not support the existence of anomalistic phenomena in which the
correct answer was true [True Sup vs. True NoSup]. The repeated-measures factor was
support/no support and the between-subjects factor was high/low belief. There were 19
low and 21 high believers. Boxplot analyses revealed no outliers. There was no main
effect for type of support, F(\, 38) = .06, p — .81; there was no main effect for level of
belief, F(l, 38) = 2,p= .66. In addition, there was no interaction between type of
support and level of belief, F(l, 38) = .39, p = .54. Table 3 provides means and standard
deviations for the different groups of believers and their recall scores.
A mixed ANOVA examined the accuracy of participant responses on abstracts
that either did or did not support the existence of anomalistic phenomena in which the
correct answer was false [False Sup vs. False NoSup]. The repeated-measures factor was
support/no support and the between-subjects factor was high/low belief. Boxplot analyses
revealed three outliers. After removing these, there were 17 low and 20 high believers.
There was no main effect for type of support, F(l, 35) = .98,/? = .33; there was no main
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effect for level of belief, F(l, 35) = 1.9,/? = .18. However, past research has suggested
that high TAP believers would be more likely, relative to low believers, to report that
anomalistic phenomena had been supported when it had not. Although not significant, the
interaction was in the predicted direction, F(l, 35) = 2.16,/? = .15. An independentsamples Mest revealed that, as predicted, there was no difference between low and high
believers when the abstracts supported anomalistic phenomena, 7(35) = .47,/? = .64;
however, when abstracts did not support anomalistic phenomena, low believers were
marginally more accurate relative to high believers, t(35) = 1.96,/? = .06.
Pseudoscientific Paranormal Phenomena
A mixed ANOVA examined the accuracy of participant responses on abstracts
that either did or did not support the existence of anomalistic phenomena in which the
correct answer was true [True Sup vs. True NoSup]. The repeated-measures factor was
support/no support and the between-subjects factor was high/low belief. There were 21
low and 20 high believers. Boxplot analyses revealed no outliers. There was no main
effect of type of support, F(l, 39) = .00,/? = .98; there was a main effect of level of
belief, F(l, 39) = 3.97,/? = .05, partial n2 = .09. Low believers outperformed believers
under the no support condition, t(39) = 2.08,/? = .04. In addition, there was no interaction
between type of support and level of belief, F(l, 39) = .59, p = .45.
A mixed ANOVA examined the accuracy of participant responses on abstracts
that either did or did not support the existence of anomalistic phenomena in which the
correct answer was false [False Sup vs. False NoSup]. The repeated-measures factor was
support/no support and the between-subjects factor was high/low belief. Boxplot analyses
revealed three outliers. After removing these, there were 18 low and 20 high believers.
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There was no main effect of type of support, F(l, 36) = 1.28,/? = .27; there was no main
effect of level of belief, F(l, 36) = 2.18,/? = .15. In addition, there was no interaction
between type of support and level of belief, F(l, 36) = .62, p = .44.
Discussion
Zusne and Jones (1989) identified several factors that influence the perseverance
of anomalistic belief. Some examples include the influence of expectations, anomalous
learning and misattributing extraordinary causes to ordinary events. The goal of Study 2
was to assess whether, in addition to these factors, selective learning may play a role (see
also Jones & Russell, 1980; Russell & Jones, 1980; Wiseman & Morris, 1995). However,
a ceiling effect appeared for all four critical question types making it difficult to interpret
the data. That is, the highest point value one could achieve on the recall test for any given
critical question type was three points. In all cases, mean scores never dropped below two
points and in most cases, mean scores were much higher.
Consistent with past research, high and low believers in TAP did not perform
differently when they read abstracts that supported the existence of anomalistic
phenomena. Researchers have argued that believers do well on this type of task because
the information provided by the abstract is congruent with their prior beliefs and low
believers do well because, although the information is not congruent with their beliefs,
they do not exhibit a bias in informational encoding and/or retrieval (Jones & Russell,
1980; Russell & Jones, 1980; Wiseman & Morris, 1995). I did not find a significant
difference between high and low believers in TAP when the abstract did not support the
existence of anomalistic phenomena and the correct answer was true. These findings
contradict previous research and my hypothesis. However, when the abstract did not
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support the existence of anomalistic phenomena and the correct answer was false, low
believers tended to be more accurate than believers in TAP, though this result was only
marginally significant.
I hypothesized that high and low believers in PSAP would not perform differently
when reading abstracts that either did or did not support the existence of anomalistic
phenomena. To that end, my hypothesis was partially supported. When the correct
answer was false, there was no difference in performance between these two groups.
However, when the correct answer was true, low believers outperformed high believers in
PSAP regardless of whether the abstract did or did not support the existence of
anomalistic phenomena. Although one could argue that low believers would have more
accurate recall than PSAP believers when information does not support the existence of
anomalistic phenomena (i.e., high PSAP believers may show similar biases as high TAP
believers), there is no a priori reason to suspect that low believers would have more
accurate recall (relative to PSAP believers) when the abstract supported the existence of
anomalistic phenomena. Although I hypothesized that high PSAP believers would be
more similar to low PSAP believers than to high TAP believers, a plausible alternative
hypothesis is that high PSAP believers show a similar pattern to high TAP believers in
that they are less accurate when it comes to abstracts that do not support the existence of
anomalistic phenomena. Therefore, this result seems to be an aberration and should be
interpreted cautiously.
In order to get a greater range of recall accuracy so as to assess any differences in
selective learning between TAP and PSAP believers, in Study 3 I increased the time
between reading and recall. With the increased length of time between reading and recall,
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all participants should be less likely to score as accurately as they did in Study 2.1
hypothesize that inaccuracies will be more likely to come from high TAP believers under
conditions where the abstract does not support the existence of anomalistic phenomena.

CHAPTER IV

STUDY3

Study 3 is a replication of Study 2 except that the time between abstract reading
and question recall was increased by four days. As in Study 2,1 hypothesized that higher
belief in TAP would be associated with less accurate reporting when the abstract does not
support the existence of anomalistic phenomena, and that belief in PSAP would be
unrelated to reporting accuracy.
Method
Participants
Participants were 260 undergraduate psychology students (49 males, 209 females,
2 did not indicate gender) enrolled in introductory psychology courses at a public
university in the northeastern United States. The mean age of participants was 18.8 (SD =
1.02).
Procedure and Measures
The same procedures and measures that were used in Study 2 were used in this
study with a few modifications. At Time 1, participants completed the same scales and
demographic information described in Study 2. At that time they also read the 12

abstracts used in Study 2. However, the time between reading and recall was increased to
four days (Time 2). At Time 2, participants were asked the same questions used in Study
2.
Dependent variables
The same dependent variables used in Study 2 were used in this study except that
I collapsed the abstracts from four (TrueSup, TrueNoSup, FalseSup, FalseNoSup) to two
(Sup, NoSup) categories.
Results
The correlation between TAP and PSAP was r = .88,/? < .001. The TAP and
PSAP scales had Cronbach Alphas of .84 and .86, respectively. Given that these two
scales were highly correlated I used paired samples Mests to create subscales. The TAP
subscale was based only on those items for which means were significantly higher than
the PSAP item counterpart, and vice versa. In addition, I dropped items that were
explicitly religious in nature (e.g., mentioned God, the devil, heaven and hell) because of
the lack of an analogous pseudoscientific explanation and because of past research
indicating the difficulty of interpreting the religious/paranormal association. The final
TAP was made up of the following items: "The soul continues to exist though the body
may die," "Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel (astral projection),"
"Reincarnation does occur," "Some psychics can accurately predict the future." The final
PSAP was made up of the following items: "By focusing the energy of their body, some
individuals are able to levitate (lift) objects without physically touching them," "Some
animal that has been described as 'The abominable snowman of Tibet' exists," "Planetary
movements can influence humans and by carefully studying such movements, some

people can accurately predict the future," "Some animal that has been described as 'The
Loch Ness monster of Scotland' exists." Thefinalfour-item TAP scale had a mean of 16
(SD = 4.88) and the final four-item PSAP scale had a mean of 11.86 (SD = 4.8). The
correlation between these two scales was r = .46, p < .001. The TAP and PSAP scales
had Cronbach Alphas of .66, and .67, respectively. Table 4 shows the full paired samples
t-ttst analysis.
I examined participants who fell in the lower (a score of 12 or lower) and upper (a
score of 18 or higher) quartiles of TAP and the lower (a score of 8 or lower) and upper (a
score of 15 or higher) quartiles of PSAP in order to obtain clearer differences between
low and high believers. (I also examined the continuous measures of TAP and PSAP and
their relation to accuracy scores but the general pattern of results did not differ from the
dichotomous method.)
Traditional Anomalistic Phenomena
A mixed ANOVA examined the accuracy of participant responses on abstracts
that either did or did not support the existence of anomalistic phenomena [Sup vs.
NoSup]. The repeated-measures factor was support/no support and the between-subjects
factor was high/low belief. Boxplot analyses revealed no outliers. There were 51 low and
80 high believers. There was no main effect for type of support, F(\, 129) = 2.74, p =
.10. There was no main effect for level of belief, F(\, 129) = 0.08,/? = .78. There was a
significant interaction between type of support and level of belief, F(\, 129) = 5.94, p =
.012, r/2 = .044. When abstracts supported the existence of anomalistic phenomena, high
TAP believers' scores (M= 3.99, SD = 1.27) tended to be higher than low believers' (M
= 3.59, SD = 1.25), t(\29) = -\.ll,p=

.08. When abstracts did not support the existence

of anomalistic phenomena, low believers' scores (M= 4.18, SD = 1.29) tended to be
higher than high believers' (M= 3.88, SD = 1.29), /(129) = 1.30,p = .19.
Pseudoscientific Paranormal Phenomena
A mixed ANOVA examined the accuracy of participant responses on abstracts
that either did or did not support the existence of anomalistic phenomena [Sup vs.
NoSup]. The repeated-measures factor was support/no support and the between-subjects
factor was high/low belief. Boxplot analyses revealed three outliers and I removed them
from the analysis. After removing these, there were 58 low and 70 high believers. There
was a main effect for type of support, F(l, 126) = 3.99, p = .048, rj2 = .031. Participants
were more accurate when abstracts did not support the existence of anomalistic
phenomena (M= 3.91, SD = 1.37) than when they did (M= 3.66, SD = 1.24). There was
no main effect for level of belief, F(l, 126) = .113,/? = .74. There was a significant
interaction between type of support and level of belief, F(l, 126) = 6.86, p = .01, ij .052. When abstracts supported the existence of anomalistic phenomena, high PSAP
believers' scores (M= 3.80, SD = 1.26) tended to be higher than low believers' (M=
3.50, SD = 1.2), t(\26) = -1.37,/? = .17. When abstracts did not support the existence of
anomalistic phenomena, low believers' scores (M= 4.14, SD = 1.36) tended to be higher
than high believers' (M= 3.71, SD = 1.35), t(l26) = 1.76,p = .08. Table 5 provides
means and standard deviations for the different groups of believers and their recall scores.
One of the issues with the TAP and PSAP measures was that participants could be
low on both (skeptics), high on TAP and low on PSAP (believers in magic), high on
PSAP and low on TAP (believers in pseudoscience), or high on TAP and PSAP
(generally credulous people). By not removing those who are high on both scales it is

impossible to get a clear understanding of the pattern of results. Therefore, I removed all
individuals who scored both in the top quartile of the TAP and PSAP scales (38
individuals) and reran the previously reported analyses.
Refined Traditional Anomalistic Phenomena
There were 51 low and 46 high believers. There was no main effect for type of
support, F(l, 95) = 2.72,/? = .10. There was no main effect for level of belief, F(l, 95) =
A4,p = .51. There was a marginally significant interaction, F(l, 95) = 3.15,/? = .08, tj =
.032. When abstracts supported the existence of anomalistic phenomena high believers'
scores (M= 4.02, SD = 1.24) tended to be higher than low believers' (M= 3.59, SD =
1.25), t(95) = -1.71, p = .09. When abstracts did not support the existence of anomalistic
phenomena low TAP believers' scores (M= 4.18, SD = 1.29) tended to be higher than
high believers' (M= 4, SD = 1.3), /(95) = .67, p = .51. Table 6 provides means and
standard deviations for the different groups of believers and their recall scores for these
refined analyses.
Refined Pseudoscientific Paranormal Phenomena
There were 58 low and 38 high believers. There was a main effect for type of
support, F(l, 94) = 6.00, p = .02, r/2 = .06. Participants were more accurate when
abstracts did not support the existence of anomalistic phenomena (M= 4.04, SD ~ 1.32)
than when they did (M- 3.58, SD - 1.19). There was no main effect for level of belief,
F{\, 94) = .007,p = .94. There was no interaction, F(l, 94) = 1.83,/? = .18.
Discussion
People continue to have high belief in anomalistic phenomena and, in Study 3,
this was generally attributed to pseudoscientific belief. Table 7 provides descriptive
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statistics for the question "To what extent do you believe in 'paranormal phenomena'
(e.g., ESP, telekinesis)?" (Studies 1,2, and 3).
By increasing the time between abstract reading and information recall to four
days in Study 3, participants were, in general, not as accurate as participants in Study 2.
Thus, the ceiling effect from the previous study was eliminated. However, this change in
procedure did not lead to a full support of the hypotheses.
Individuals who were high in TAP belief had greater accuracy relative to low
believers when abstracts supported the existence of anomalistic phenomena but this
pattern was reversed when abstracts did not support anomalistic phenomena. This pattern
held regardless of using the full or refined sample, although the interaction was weaker in
the refined sample possibly due to a lower sample. This partially contradicts my findings
from Study 2 and past research (Jones & Russell, 1980; Russell & Jones, 1980; Wiseman
& Morris, 1995). In Study 2 (False Sup vs. False NoSup), I found that low believers were
more accurate than high believers when abstracts did not support anomalistic phenomena;
however, the two groups were equally accurate when abstracts supported anomalistic
phenomena, a finding consistent with past research. However, high believers may be
biased to remember abstracts as supportive when they were not and that bias may become
stronger over time. If so, that would explain the findings of Study 3. The opposite finding
would have been more difficult to explain (i.e., that high believers are more accurate
relative to low believers under conditions of no support and low believers are more
accurate relative to high believers under conditions of support).
The unrefined PSAP analysis showed similar results as the TAP analysis. That is,
high believers were more accurate than low believers under conditions of support, and
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low believers were more accurate than high believers under conditions of no support. One
of the problems with creating a scale to distinguish pseudoscientific from traditional
beliefs is that it is difficult to unambiguously frame a given anomalistic phenomena as
scientifically, not magically, based. Clearly, the PSAP scale leaves room for a more
magical interpretation by participants of the phenomena being mentioned than was
intended. Thus, it is likely that the difference in accuracy scores between high and low
PSAP believers was at least partially due to the fact that the high believers included some
high believers in TAP. Indeed, when using a more refined analysis the interaction effect
was not significant. Finally, participants, regardless of belief, were more accurate when
abstracts did not support the existence of anomalistic phenomena relative to when they
did. This result is not consistent with the research on traditional belief. However, it is
consistent with the idea that high and low PSAP believers show similar memory biases.

CHAPTER V

STUDY4

Researchers and educators have long been interested in the public's (especially
students) attitudes toward science, mathematics, technology and engineering (Gokhale,
Brauchle & Machina, 2009; Marshall, Blalock, Liu, Pruski, Toepperwein, Owen &
Lichtenstein, 2007). It seems that the United States continues to lag behind several
countries in the areas of science and math (Marshall et al., 2007). Further, although the
demand for jobs in various scientific fields is projected to increase by 47% in the next
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decade, the increase in labor force will be inadequate to meet that goal at the current rate
(Gokhale, Brauchle & Machina, 2009). Many measures have been constructed to assess
the links between attitudes about science, math, technology, and engineering and
pursuing careers in those areas (Gogolin & Swartz, 1992; Gokhale, Brauchle & Machina,
2009; Marshall et al., 2007; Moore, 1973; Simpson & Troost, 1982). It follows that
believers in TAP and PSAP take a different approach toward science given that these
believers may explain anomalistic phenomena in either magical or scientific terms,
respectively.
Differences between TAP and PSAP belief may exist in the form of enthusiasm
for, trust in, and understanding of, sciences' concepts and practitioners. I hypothesize that
high believers in PSAP have more positive attitudes towards science and scientists, are
more involved with science (reading science articles, watching science programs), and
are more likely to endorse science as the best method for studying anomalistic
phenomena, relative to high believers in TAP. In order to test this, I first developed the
«

Regard for Science Scale (RSS) and then examined the association between TAP and
RSS and the association between PSAP and RSS.
Method
Participants
Participants were 203 undergraduate psychology students (46 male, 154 female, 3
did not indicate gender) enrolled in introductory psychology courses at a public
university in the northeastern United States. The mean age of participants was 18.8 (SD =
1.05). Participant data used in Study 4 were collected while running Study 3.
Procedure and Measures
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In addition to the measures described in Study 3, participants completed a survey
that assessed their attitudes about science. The RSS was a 17-item measure with a 7-point
rating scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The RSS was scored so that
higher ratings indicated more positive attitudes toward science. See Appendix C for all of
the RSS items.
Results
A pilot sample of n = 40 participants was used to conduct a preliminary factor
analysis on the RSS. The sample was taken from a larger pool of participants who
completed Study 3 and were not used for further analysis. All items loaded on a single
factor that accounted for 36.35% of the variance. No rotation was used. Items with a
loading less than .5 were dropped from the final scale. Thus, the following six items were
excluded: "Science is the best way to answer questions about the universe," "I think that
politicians should consult with scientists before making laws and policies," "Most
scientists are too narrow minded when it comes to paranormal phenomena," "We can't
trust science because what is considered 'true' today may be disproven by new
breakthroughs tomorrow," "Most scientists are book smart but lack common sense,"
"Things like mind reading and ghosts are supernatural occurrences that are outside the
realm of science." The final RSS (n = 203) had a possible range of 12 to 84. The final
RSS had a Cronbach reliability of .85.
The original sample contained N= 239 participants. After removing individuals
who were high on both PSAP and TAP (the PSAP and TAP scales in this study were
constructed from the same items as study 3), the data appeared to be reasonably normally
distributed (n = 203). The TAP was significantly correlated to the RSS, r = -.24, p < .001.

35
A hierarchical regression analysis was used to predict RSS from TAP and other variables
that were used in Study 1 and assumed to be related to a general regard for science such
as rationality (assumed to be positively related) and experientiality (assumed to be
negatively related). The regression to predict RSS from TAP was significant, F(l, 202) =
11.86,/? < .001, R2 = .06. Next, the regression to predict RSS from TAP, Ratal, Exp, TIA,
BIGL, Chnce, Intrnl, and Powful was also significant, F(8,202) = 9.79, p < .001, R2 =
.29. When controlling for all other predictor variables, TAP significantly predicted RSS,
t(202) = -2.48, p = .014, sr2 = .02. Higher belief in traditional anomalistic phenomena
was associated with lower regard for science. When controlling for all other predictor
variables, Ratal significantly predicted RSS, <202) = 5.21, p < .001, sr2 = .09. Higher
rationality was associated with higher regard for science. Finally, when controlling for all
other predictor variables, Intrnl significantly predicted RSS, f(202) = 2.05, p = .04, sr =
.02. Individuals with an internal locus of control were more likely to have a high regard
for science. No other variables were significant predictors. Table 8 provides the
individual betas and SE for each predictor.
The PSAP and RSS were marginally correlated, r = -.10,/? = .07. A regression
analysis was used to predict RSS from PSAP. The results were not significant, F(l, 202)
= 2.18,/? = .14. Next, the regression to predict RSS from PSAP, Ratal, Exp, TIA, BIGL,
Chnce, Intrnl, and Powful was significant, F(8,202) = 8.82,/? < .001, R2 = .27. When
controlling for all other predictor variables, Ratal significantly predicted RSS, f(202) =
5.65,p < .001, sr2 = .12. Higher rationality was associated with higher regard for science.
Finally, when controlling for all other predictor variables, Intrnl marginally predicted
RSS, f(202) = 1.85,/? = .07, sr2 = .01. Individuals with an internal locus of control were

more likely to have a high regard for science. No other variables were significant
predictors. Table 8 provides the individual betas and SE for each predictor.
Discussion
To the extent that believers in TAP and PSAP differ in their interpretation of
anomalistic phenomena, and to the extent that this difference is based on their attitudes
toward science, I expected to show that TAP would be negatively associated with RSS
and that PSAP would be positively associated with RSS. My hypothesis was partially
supported. The more participants endorsed traditional beliefs in anomalistic phenomena,
the lower their regard for science. Some researchers have suggested that people who have
a high belief in anomalistic phenomena also have deficiencies in scientific reasoning and
critical thinking. However, as previously mentioned, that idea does not have robust
empirical support. One explanation of why high TAP believers may have a lower regard
for science is because science is typically at odds with their belief system. Thus, they are
more inclined to be skeptical of it and less likely to enjoy it than low-to-non believers.
However, the belief that anomalistic phenomena are real and have, or potentially
have, scientific explanations was not associated with higher regard for science. Indeed,
the direction was opposite from what I originally predicted. There may be several reasons
for this result. One, PSAP belief is, ultimately, irrational and, by definition, false science.
It may be that those who strongly endorse PSAP are skeptical of mainstream science,
although to a lesser extent relative to high TAP believers. In Study 1,1 found that PSAP
was not significantly related to rationality whereas TAP was (though this relationship was
negative). Study 4 is consistent with those findings to the extent that rationality serves as
a proxy for science (indeed, rationality was strongly predictive of regard for science).

Second, the PSAP measure has, as previously stated, several issues. The lack of a
positive association between PSAP and RSS could be due to problems with the PSAP
scale that were mentioned in Study 3.1 will employ a different measure of PSAP on any
future studies that seek to explore possible differences between traditional and
pseudoscientific believers.

CHAPTER VI

GENERAL DISCUSSION

There are practical reasons for trying to distinguish between TAP and PSAP
beliefs. Researchers have noted that traditional intervention programs (most of which
focus on increasing science knowledge, critical thinking, and, in a few cases, debunking
paranormal claims) have been largely inadequate at dispelling anomalistic belief. If
indeed there is a distinction between TAP and PSAP (and if this distinction has statistical
and practical significance), then debunking belief in anomalistic claims, such as "witches
are real," may not have any meaningful impact on the comparatively sophisticated belief
system of, for example, how psi phenomena works.
In Study 1,1 examined how several individual difference variables correlated with
measures of TAP and PSAP. Consistent with past research, I found that higher TAP
belief was correlated with lower rationality, higher levels of experientiality, and higher
levels of non-clinical depression and belief in chance/fate. Higher levels of PSAP belief
were likewise correlated with higher belief in chance/fate and experientiality, but
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regression analysis indicated that it was also associated with higher tolerance of
ambiguity and higher internality, both of which are measures that are generally associated
with skeptics.
In Study 2,1 attempted to replicate previous research that showed a difference in
recall accuracy between high and low believers on material that does not support the
existence of anomalistic phenomena. In addition, I hypothesized that such differences
would not exist between high and low believers in PSAP. My hypotheses were partially
supported in that, in the False Sup vs. False NoSup condition, low believers were more
accurate relative to high believers when the abstract was not supportive. In addition, I did
not find an interaction under either PSAP condition (True Sup vs. True NoSup, or False
Sup vs. False NoSup), indicating no difference in recall accuracy between high and low
believers. However, because I was unable to completely replicate previous findings, and
in order to further refine the PSAP scale and differentiate between TAP and PSAP
believers, I included a four day time delay in Study 3 and removed individuals who were
high on both belief measures.
In Study 3,1 continued to have only partial support for my hypotheses. High
believers in TAP were more accurate than low believers under support conditions (a
finding not consistent with past research but not inexplicable), but low believers were
more accurate than high believers under conditions of no support (consistent with past
research). After removing individuals who scored highly on both measures of belief, high
PSAP believers were as accurate as low believers under both conditions although all
participants were generally more accurate when abstracts did not support the existence of
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anomalistic phenomena. Thus, the pattern of high and low PSAP believers was different
than the pattern of high and low TAP believers.
Finally, in Study 41 attempted to develop a scale that could potentially distinguish
between TAP and PSAP believers on a variable that was central to the supposed
distinction—namely, regard for science. Again, my hypotheses were partially supported.
Higher belief in TAP was associated with lower regard for science, as predicted but belief
in PSAP was not associated with regard for science. Belief in anomalistic phenomena is
diametrically opposed to science, and this opposition is readily apparent. The significant
negative relation between the TAP and RSS is consistent with this idea. The relation
between pseudoscientific belief and science is less distinct and this is evidenced in part
by the fact that I did not find a significant association between the two. However, given
the previously mentioned problems with the PSAP scale, future research should
reexamine this relationship with a better scale.
Limitations and Future Directions
According to some, anomalistic belief can be influenced by factors such as
personality, interpersonal relationships, personal experiences, classical and operant
conditioning, and errors in reasoning (French, 1992; Skinner, 1948; Vyse, 1997; Zusne &
Jones 1989). There is also some evidence that anomalistic belief is perpetuated by
selective learning (Jones & Russell, 1980; Russell & Jones, 1980; Wiseman & Morris,
1995). However, the current studies only partially support that evidence. One of the goals
of the present studies was to show, conclusively, that there exists a distinction between
traditional and pseudoscientific ways of thinking about anomalistic phenomena. That
goal was not met. However, this line of research should not yet be abandoned.

First, the majority of participants in these studies indicated that they believed m
certain anomalistic phenomena because of scientific, not magical, reasons. In Study 3, in
particular, approximately 71% of believers indicated pseudoscientific explanations.
Across Studies 1 through 3, approximately 52% indicated pseudoscientific explanations.
It may be of interest to determine whether similar levels of magic vs. science
explanations for anomalistic belief are present in the general population or whether only
college students are more likely endorse pseudoscience over magic. Do people endorse
pseudoscientific over magical explanations because they think it makes them sound more
reasonable or intelligent? Second, if there is a clear distinction, it is of importance to be
able to measure it for reasons previously stated (i.e., more effective education).
One of the most puzzling resultsfromthe present studies has been a lack of
replication of past research concerning traditional belief and selective learning. French
(1992) noted that different methods for assessing belief can lead to different outcomes
and my methodology departed from Wiseman and Morris (1995), Jones and Russell
(1980), and Russell and Jones (1980) in several ways. Wiseman and Morris (1995)
created a measure of belief that only tapped psi phenomena, as opposed to a more
general, wider range of anomalistic beliefs. In addition, their source material (taped
demonstrations) dealt solely with psi phenomena (e.g., mentally bending a fork). Jones
and Russell (1980) used a general measure of paranormal belief (the Belief in Paranormal
Scale developed by Jones, Russell and Nickel, 1977), but they used a live demonstration
of attempted ESP instead of abstracts. Russell and Jones (1980) used the Belief in
Paranormal Scale and gave their participants an abstract that either did or did not support
the existence of ESP. This latter method was most similar to the present studies except
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that I included several more abstracts that covered a wide range of anomalistic
phenomena.
Despite the differences in methods, these authors found that low believers were
able to recall effectively both pro- and counter-attitudinal information whereas high
believers were not as effective. Further, low and high believers did not differ when the
information they received supported the existence of anomalistic phenomena. In
particular, I have been unable to replicate this latter finding. That is, high TAP believers
in the present studies were generally more accurate than low TAP believers when
recalling information that supported anomalistic phenomena. This effect occurred in
Study 3, and it is possible that the time delay triggered low/high believers' differential
"response sets" (Wiseman & Morris, 1995, p. 119). High believers' response set might
bias them toward reporting that the anomalistic phenomenon described in the abstract had
occurred, whereas low believers' response set might bias them in the opposite way. Thus,
when the abstract supported the occurrence of the anomalistic phenomenon high
believers would be correct, and when the abstract did not support the occurrence of the
anomalistic phenomenon low believers would be correct.
Irwin (1993) wrote about the need to get an "explicit consensus view" on the
"nature and functions" of anomalistic belief (p. 1). The present research attempted to aid
in that endeavor. Future research should explore the topic of anomalistic belief further,
addressing the methodological concerns of the present research and looking into related
avenues. A new PSAP belief scale should not include items relating to overtly religious
concepts (e.g., God, the devil, heaven, hell) or overtly superstitious concepts (e.g., black
cats bring bad luck, the number 13 is unlucky) because there is no clear way to frame

such concepts in scientific terms. However, belief of continued existence after death,
although generally thought to be a religious theme, could be included because the idea
that consciousness is somehow separate from the body has, to many PSAP believers, a
ready scientific explanation (e.g., the enduring nature of thought energy, quantum
mechanics). The new scale might ask responders whether they believe in a given
phenomenon and, if yes, to indicate their reason using a scale with anchors of
supernatural/magic on one end and science on the other.
Finally, any scale that is designed to tap PSAP belief should be aware of language
that suggests greater or lesser personal agency. For example, one itemfromthe TAP
scale reads, "Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel (astral projection),"
whereas the analogous item on the PSAP scale reads, "It is possible to focus your energy
such that your consciousness can leave your body and travel." The PSAP item is more
suggestive of personal control than the TAP item. It is possible that individuals would
rate those items differently depending on their level of perceived personal control
(internal/external) and not specifically depending on their belief in pseudoscientific or
magical explanations of anomalistic phenomena. Indeed, the resultsfromthe present
study show that internal locus of control is marginally associated with PSAP, but not
TAP, belief.
Not answered in the present research is what people think of others who give
either magical or pseudoscientific explanations for their belief in anomalistic phenomena.
Are their perceptions of others mediated by their own reasons for their belief? Do
skeptics think more highly of a person who gives pseudoscientific, as opposed to
magical, explanations or are both explanations viewed as equally naive? In addition, are
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people who are more open-minded toward anomalistic phenomena (regardless of
explanation) viewed more or less positively than skeptics? Participants could be asked to
write a short paragraph about a variety of mundane topics. The critical topic would
involve putative anomalistic phenomena. After giving their own response, participants
could be given a response supposedly generated by another participant that indicated that
s/he was a high TAP believer, high PSAP believer, or a skeptic, and then asked to rate the
person on several measures (e.g., intelligence, creativeness).
Emmons and Sobel (1981) discussed the finding that although women and men
have similar overall levels of anomalistic belief, research consistently shows that, relative
to men, women tend to be more skeptical of UFOs and creatures such as bigfoot (see also
Coll & Taylor, 2004). It would be of interest to explore the factors behind this gender
difference (and other possible differences in belief in various anomalistic phenomena).
Emmons and Sobel (1981) suggested (but did not test) that women may be more likely to
believe in phenomena like ESP because of their cultural association with "communicative
awareness or 'intuition'" (p. 55). Future research could examine whether belief in psychic
abilities is moderated by level of perceived intuition and, further, if there are gender
differences.
Conclusion
The overarching goal of the present study was to construct measures that could
distinguish between pseudoscientific and traditional anomalistic belief. I attempted to do
this in three main ways. First, I reworded a well supported anomalistic belief scale (the
RPB) so that it contained pseudoscientific (not magical) terminology and then examined
its correlation with other, established measures. Second, I attempted to show that the
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measures could distinguish between traditional and pseudoscientific believers on a
memory task. In contrast to studies that either read or observed only one anomalistic
event, I used several abstracts on a variety of phenomena in order to increase reliability
and generalizability. Overall, I found it difficult to distinguish between TAP and PSAP
believers using the measures I constructed. Finally, because the fundamental difference
between TAP and PSAP believers was hypothesized to be their regard for, and interest in,
science, I developed the RSS. The RSS distinguished TAP and PSAP believers in that it
was negatively associated with TAP, and positively associated (but not significantly so)
with PSAP. The present research opens up avenues for future research.
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Table 1
Correlations Between Scales and Traditional and Pseudoscientific Anomalistic Belief
Subscale
BIGL TIA RSE CESD Ratal Exp Chnce Intrnl Powful
Traditional Paranormal Belief (n = 84)
TAP
BIGL
TIA
RSE
CESD
Ratal
Exp
Chnce
Intrnl

.13

-.07
-.22

-.10
.38
-.04

.18*
-.38
.12
-.75***

-.29**
-.05
.43***
.23*
-.29**

.25** .18*
.12
.14
.19* -.12
.23* -.24**
-.26** .18*
.26** -.26**
-.18*

-.03
-.02
-.06
.22*
-.24*
.19*
.30**
-.27**

-.05
-.17
-.09
-.38***
.38***
-.21*
-.18*
.47***
-.08

Pseudoscientific Anomalistic Belief (n = 91)
.34** .41***
.12
PSAP
.20*
.16 -.03
.09
-.13
.14
BIGL
.20*
.23**
.11
.03
-.10
.21* -.19* -.10
-.24*
.08
-.02
.36***
.14
-.20*
.17
TIA
.25** -.34*** .30**
-.39***
RSE
-.69*** .39***
-.29** -.11
.25**
CESD
.14
-.24**
.24** -.47*** .41*** -.41***
Ratal
-.26**
Exp
.03
.19*
Chnce
-.19*
.52***
-.10
Intrnl
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. Traditional Anomalistic Phenomena (TAP),
Pseudoscientific Anomalistic Phenomena (PSAP), Belief in Good Luck (BIGL),
Tolerance/Intolerance for Ambiguity (TIA), Rosenberg Self-Esteem (RSE), Center for
Epidemiological Studies Depression (CESD), Rationality (Ratal), Experientiality (Exp),
Chance (Chnce), Internal (Intrnl), Powerful Others (Powful).
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Table 2
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Traditional and Pseudoscientific
AnomalisticBelief
Variable
SEB
B
Traditional Anomalistic Belief (n = 84)
BIGL
TIA
RSES
CESD
Ratal
Exp
Chnce
Intrnl
Powful

0.29
0.01
0.13
0.38
-0.35
0.61
0.30
-0.03
0.32

0.25
0.16
0.37
0.23
0.15
0.18
0.33
0.30
0.34

0.14
0.01
0.05
0.26
- 0.29*
0.39"*
0.11
-0.01
0.01

Pseudoscientific Anomalistic Belief (n = 91)
0.04
0.21
BIGL
0.09
0.23*
TIA
0.16
0.38
0.15
0.32
RSES
0.33
0.18
CESD
0.27
0.19
0.14
-0.15
Ratal
-0.17
0.14
0.26**
Exp
0.37
0.32
0.43***
1.12
Chnce
Intrnl
0.54
0.28
0.19
0.24
-0.01
Powful
-0.22
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. Traditional Anomalistic Phenomena (TAP),
Pseudoscientific Anomalistic Phenomena (PSAP), Belief in Good Luck (BIGL),
Tolerance/Intolerance for Ambiguity (TIA), Rosenberg Self-Esteem (RSE), Center for
Epidemiological Studies Depression (CESD), Rationality (Ratal), Experientiality (Exp),
Chance (Chnce), Internal (Intrnl), Powerful Others (Powful).
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Table 3
Mean Correct Responses for High and Low Believers When the Correct Answer Was
True/False and When Abstracts Did/Did Not Support Anomalistic Phenomena (Study 2)
TAP

PSAP

True Sup
Low Belief
High Belief

2.58 (.61)
2.43 (.68)

2.52 (.68)
2.30 (.66)

True NoSup
Low Belief
Hieh Belief

2.47 (.69)
2.48 (.60)

2.62 (.67)
2.20 (.62)

TAP
False Sup
Low Belief
High Belief

2.47 (.72)
2.35 (.81)

PSAP
2.56 (.71)
2.10(1.02)

False NoSup
Low Belief
2.53 (.61)
2.28 (.67)
Hieh Belief
2.05 (.89)
2.05 (.89)
Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Traditional Anomalistic Phenomena
(TAP), Pseudoscientific Anomalistic Phenomena (PSAP), True Support (True Sup), True
No Support (True NoSup), False Support (False Sup), False No Support (False NoSup).
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Table 4
Paired Samples i-tests between items on the TAP andPSAP scale
TAP-PSAP
t
2
Item 1 (soul)
8.05
<.001
-3.85
<.001
Item 2 (levitate)
Item 3 (magic)
0.29
.77
Item 4 (astral)
2.38
.02
Item 5 (bigfoot)
-3.28
.001
Item 6 (astrology)
-2.25
.025
Item 7 (devil)
9.23
<.001
Item 8 (sleep)
.13
-1.53
Item 9 (Loch Ness) -1.99
.05
Item 10 (God)
2.43
.02
Item 11 (reincarnation) 5.34
<.001
Item 12 (aliens)
-0.95
.35
Item 13 (psychic)
2.86
.005
Item 14 (Heaven)
6.89
<.001
Item 15 (mind)
0.03
.97
Item 16 (dead)
1.92
.06
Note. Items 7,10, 14 were not used to construct the final TAP scale
Because they dealt with religious themes. See Appendix A and B
for TAP and PSAP items, respectively.

Table 5
Mean Correct Responses for High and Low Believers When Abstracts Did/Did Not
Support Anomalistic Phenomena (Study 3)
Sup
Low Belief
High Belief

TAP

PSAP

3.59 (1.25)
3.99 (1.27)

3.50 (1.20)
3.80 (1.26)

NoSup
Low Belief
4.18(1.29)
4.14(1.36)
High Belief
3.88(1.29)
3.71 (1.35)
Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Traditional Anomalistic Phenomena
(TAP), Pseudoscientific Anomalistic Phenomena (PSAP), Support (Sup), No Support
(NoSup).
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Table 6
Refined Mean Correct Responses for High and Low Believers When Abstracts Did/Did
Not Support Anomalistic Phenomena (Study 3)
TAP
Sup
Low Belief
High Belief

3.59 (1.25)
4.02(1.24)

PSAP
3.50 (1.20)
3.71(1.16)

NOSUP

Low Belief
4.18 (1.29)
4.14 (1.36)
High Belief
4.00(1.30)
3.89(1.27)
Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Traditional Anomalistic Phenomena
(TAP), Pseudoscientific Anomalistic Phenomena (PSAP), Support (Sup), No Support
(NoSup).
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Table 7
Number and Percentage of Participants Indicating Reasons for Their Response to "To
what extent do you believe in paranormal phenomena' (e.g., ESP, telekinesis)?'
(%)
n
Study 1 (N= 183)
No Belief
Supernatural/Magic
Science

32
100
51

(17.5)
(54.6)
(27.9)

n

(%)

No Belief
Supernatural/Magic
Science

28
31
19

(35.9)
(39.7)
(24.4)

Studv3 (N=260)

n

(%)

No Belief
Supernatural/Magic
Science

75
53
132

Studv2(JV=78)

(28.8)
(20.4)
(50.8)

Table 8
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Regard for Science Scale (Study 4)
Variable
B
SE_B
g
Stepl
TAP

-0.74

0.21

-0.24"*

-0.51
0.38
- 0.09
0.13
- 0.04
0.01
0.35
0.01

0.20
0.07
0.08
0.08
0.11
0.16
0.17
0.14

-0.16
0.38
-0.08
0.11
-0.02
0.002
0.14
0.01

-0.37

0.25

-0.10

Step 2
TAP
Ratal
Exp
TIA
BIGL
Chnce
Intrnl
Powful
Stepl
PSAP

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p< .001. Traditional Anomalistic Phenomena (TAP), Rationality
(Ratal), Experientiality (Exp), Tolerance/Intolerance for Ambiguity (TIA), Belief in
Good Luck (BIGL), (Chnce), Internal (Intrnl), Powerful Others (Powful),
Pseudoscientific Anomalistic Phenomena (PSAP) Chance.
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APPENDIX A

SHORTENED VERSION OF TABACYK'S (1988) REVISED PARANORMAL
BELIEF SCALE

1. The soul continues to exist though the body may die.
2. Some individuals are able to levitate (lift) objects through mental forces.
3. Black magic really exists.
4. Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel (astral projection).
5. The abominable snowman of Tibet exists.
6. Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future.
7. There is a devil.
8. During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the spirit can leave the body.
9. The Loch Ness monster of Scotland exists.
10. I believe in God
11. Reincarnation does occur.
12. There is life on other planets.
13. Some psychics can accurately predict the future.
14. There is a heaven and a hell.
15. Mind reading is not possible.
16. It is possible to communicate with the dead.
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APPENDIX B

PSEUDOSCIENTIFIC VERSION OF TOBACYK'S (1988) REVISED
PARANORMAL BELIEF SCALE
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1. Some form of conscious energy continues to exist though the body may die.
2. By focusing the energy of their body, some individuals are able to levitate (lift)
objects without physically touching them.
3. Some individuals can manipulate what physicists call quantum energies in ways that
cause harm to others.
4. It is possible to focus your energy such that your consciousness can leave your body
and travel.
5. Some animal that has been described as "The abominable snowman of Tibet" exists.
6. Planetary movements can influence humans and by carefully studying such
movements, some people can accurately predict the future.
7. There is a supernatural being of malevolent evil that would like to harm humanity.
8. By altering one's brain waves, such as through sleep or trances, one's consciousness
can leave the body.
9. Some animal that has been described as "The Loch Ness monster of Scotland" exists.
10. I believe in a being that is higher/more powerful than humans.
11. When a body physically dies, the person's consciousness is reborn into a new body.
12. Based on what we know from physicists and astronomers, Earth cannot be the only
planet in the Universe where life exists.
13. Some individuals are more open to what physicists call quantum energy signatures
and can accurately predict the future.
14. Once the body dies physically, a person's consciousness enters either a place of pure
bliss or extreme torment.
15. Mentally connecting to another person's thought energy is not possible.
16. Some people are open to the consciousnesses of those who have passed away and
thus can communicate with them.
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APPENDIX C

THE REGARD FOR SCIENCE SCALE
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1. Science is the best way to answer questions about life
2. Most scientists are too narrow minded when it comes to paranormal phenomena
(reverse)
3. I enjoy science
4. We can't trust science because what is considered 'true' today may be disproven by
new breakthroughs tomorrow (reverse)
5. Without science our lives would be much worse off
6. Science is the best way to answer questions about the universe
7. I think that politicians should consult with scientists before making laws and policies
8. Most scientists are book smart but lack common sense (reverse)
9. A lot of what scientists claim is true probably is not (reverse)
10. Scientists do not tell the public the truth about a lot of their work (reverse)
11. I enjoy reading articles about scientific discoveries
12. I hold science in high regard
13. Things like mind reading and ghosts are supernatural occurrences that are outside the
realm of science (reverse)
14. Science will never be able to explain things like ESP (reverse)
15.1 like to watch science programs
16. People who rely too much on science miss the magic of everyday life (reverse)
17. I usually don't bother to think too much about science (reverse)
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1. The Roswell Incident refers to an event that occurred in New Mexico in 1947 where
the Air Force recovered material from an unidentified flying object. Numerous
investigators have claimed that alien bodies and extraterrestrial materials were taken from
the crash site; although the government issued an official report stating that the object
was a weather balloon. Recently, a new report was issued by the Air Force stating that
witnesses who reported that bodies were removedfromthe site were correct. The report
added that alien bodies were removed for testing, thus further supporting that there was
paranormal activity at Roswell. Because the crash occurred on July 4th, interested people
gather in Roswell each year to view a large display of fireworks and other events,
including a pavilion for displaying new findings.
2. At Oslo University, researchers investigated whether some unknown type of life force
can leave and re-enter the body. In a tightly controlled experiment, 30 participants
claiming to be able to project their non-physical beings were asked to project from one
room to another and then to report what they saw in the other room. In the control
condition, 25 participants were asked to guess the contents of the other room. Both the
experimenter and the participants had no prior knowledge of the contents in the other
room. Out of eight trials, projectors accurately identified significantly more target objects
than control participants. The researchers plan to submit a paper of theirfindingsto a
leading peer-reviewed journal. Their long-goal plans are to obtain more funding to
expand their department's research facilities.
3. Cattle mutilation refers to thousands of cases in every state where cattle have been
found dead with no apparent explanation. The animals' blood is typically removed, yet
no trace of it is found on the ground. The udders on females are often removed and the
sexual organs on both sexes are removed with laser-precision cuts. In some cases, cattle
are found on mountain tops lying in the snow with no visible tracks near the scene. The
mutilations are clearly bizarre. Nevertheless, a likely causal explanation is human
intervention, because no scientific evidence exists linking cattle mutilations to
paranormal activity. Linda Howe, the foremost authority on cattle mutilations, states that
scientists and veterinary surgeons are working together to obtain funding for surveillance
to monitor mutilations in high activity areas.
4. Extrasensory perception (ESP) has been scientifically investigated for over 75 years.
Supporters of ESP claim that scientific evidence supports the existence of ESP, but
skeptics point to methodological flaws in those studies and claim that no scientific
evidence of ESP exists. A recently published article in Psychic Review concluded that
across 40 ESP studies, "receivers" achieved an average hit rate of 35% of the symbols
that "senders" sent telepathically. By chance, the hit rates would be 25%. Because the
35% hit rate was statistically higher than chance, the authors concluded that there was
support for the claim that ESP exists. These results among other works will be
summarized in Extrasensory Perception After 100 Years edited by Susan Whitemore. The
book is an extension of J. B. Rhine's best-seller forty years earlier.
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5. Reporting of poltergeist activity typically consists of loud noises and moving objects.
In Utah, these symptoms were recently reported by a young couple in May 2003. The
events were gradual with small noises and movement of small objects, and eventually
progressed to full bodied apparitions. The wife, who was always present in the home
when the events occurred, appeared to be more affected than her husband. A team of
psychologists visited the home several times and observed that there was a tremendous
amount of stress. They concluded that couples counseling would be the key to stopping
the ghostly activity. The disturbance received so much media coverage that the couple
was flown to the Psychological Research Foundation in Durham, North Carolina to meet
with the Director, Professor Robert Morris, Ph.D.

6. In 1905, during a religious revival in Egryn, Wales, witnesses reported various
displays of illumination above and around the chapel. The Daily Mail described how
three clergymen and numerous other witnesses saw a ball of fire rise from the ground and
explode near the preacher, Mary Jones. Welch scientists have a renewed interested in the
event because of improved instrumentation that can measure major energy vortices
around the planet. After an exhaustive investigation (which aired on BBC network),
scientists concluded that the measurements revealed significant energy levels, thus the
only explanation must be that the light was a result of geological influences. This is an
example of how science can contribute to the knowledge and understanding of the role of
nature and religion in the totality of human experiences.
7. The investigation of a homicide in Los Angeles carried on for over six months without
any leads. Frustrated and feeling pressured, the lead investigator contacted a psychic who
claimed to have exceptional clairvoyant powers. The psychic worked with the police
department for two weeks providing the detectives with numerous clues, including that
the victim was stabbed and buried in a location south of the city. The police investigated
numerous locations based on all of the leads they received, and eventually they found the
body. The lead investigator gave credit to the psychic whose clues lead to discovering the
body. With the case closed, the department can focus on the next series of homicides.
However, the lead detective plans to travel upstate for a long weekend before starting on
the next case.

8. A panel of scientific experts gathered in Paris last year to determine the validty of Uri
Zolinyat's spoon bending performance. Zolinyat, who is popular in both Europe and
Australia, has his own television show. On the show he claims that people can learn to
tap their psychokinetic powers. The scientific panel first saw the televised performance
live, then they viewed the taped performance so that they could play the tape in slow
motion. The panel also inspected the spoon. After meeting for one week, the panel
unanimously determined that the spoon was ordinary and that Zolinyat truly had
psychokinetic abilities. Following the Paris event, the performer has a rigorous schedule.

He will tour in America beginning in Nevada and ending on the Tonight Show where he
will perform many psychokinetic feats.
9. Two weeks before his assassination, Abraham Lincoln dreamt of a funeral at the White
House. Mark Twain dreamt of his brother in a casket two weeks before his brother was
killed in a boat explosion. Both of these events are examples of how some people claim
they perceive events before they occur, known as precognition. Mary Stowell, Ph.D., an
authority on the subject, recently published two articles that assessed the extent that
reported dreams are fictitious, chance events, or evidence of precognition. Few
associations were found between reported dreams and later events of participants, which
provided no support for the existence of dream precognition. Stowell continues to
investigate the phenomenon. Her present project explores the possibility of precognition
in lucid dreaming, which are dreams in which dreamers are aware that they are dreaming.

10. Channeling is a psychic phenomenon whereby mediums relinquish their minds and
bodies to a spiritual entity who takes over for the purpose of sending messages. The
practice has been part of human experience as far back as human records go; for example,
channeling appears in various religious texts. Modern interest in channeling was spurred
by actress Shirley MacLaine in the 1980s. More recent is the television show, Crossing
Over, hosted by John Edward who offers himself as a medium for the afterlife-relatives
of audience members. Careful evaluation of his performances has revealed evidence that
channeling occurs during his show. Edward, raised on Long Island, has maintained a
management position in a leading health care facility in the Northeast, and has continued
his research, and teaching in the field of parapsychology.

11. Over the past 40 years, there have been numerous reports of alleged miracles of
religious statues that shed tears or blood. Recently, there was a media craze about the
"miracle milk" in Delhi, India when for 24 hours the small stone statue of Ganeshji, the
Hindu elephant-headed God of Wisdom, consumed milk from a spoon. This event like
other reported miracles was reviewed by authorities. They determined that the statue was
porous. This evidence can be interpreted as reason to believe that the milk miracle was
not authentic, because the perceived drinking was actually caused by surface-effect
capillary action. Nevertheless, over one million liters of milk were purchased in the 24hour period as devotees flocked the nation's temples. The man who first dreamt of the
vision died soon after.

12. The appearance of McNaughtry's clever historical and scientific analysis of astrology
on the latest New York Times Top 10 Best-seller's list for non-fiction is no surprise. He
takes the reader on a ride through the centuries, beginning with Copernicus, through the
Dark Ages, and into the 21st century. The author discusses the role that astrology played
in the Vatican, in Nazi Germany, and in the White House. What makes this book
extraordinary beyond the author's collectivist style is that by using computerized models,
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McNaughtry provides evidence and he makes cogent arguments that dispel claims of
predicting future events from astrological data. He states that the internet has played a
large role in the recent increased interest in astrology, largely due to the ease of electronic
delivery of personalized forecasts.
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Roswell Incident vignette
The Roswell Incident occurred in New Mexico
Alien bodies were removed for testing, thus further supporting that there was
paranormal activity
The Roswell Incident occurred in 1967
The Air Force recovered material from an unidentified flying object
The official report originally stated that the object was farm equipment
Leaving the body vignette
30 participants in the experiment were asked to project from one room to
another
Researchers at Stockholm University investigated the phenomenon of projection
In the control condition, 20 participant were asked to project their non-physical
beings
Projectors identified significantly more target objects than control participants
Ten trials were run
Cattle mutilation vignette
In cattle mutilations, the brains are typically removed
In some cases, cattle that are mutilated are found in swimming pools
A likely causal explanation of cattle mutilation is human intervention
In cattle mutilation, the sexual organs on both sexes are surgically switched
Cattle mutilations occur in every state
ESP vignette
By chance, the hit rates of receivers would be 25%
Extrasensory perception has been scientifically investigated for no more than 35
years
The authors concluded that there was support for the claim that ESP exists
Across 40 ESP studies, receivers achieved an average hit rate of 35%
The recent article was published in Psychological Bulletin
Poltergeist vignette
A team of physicists visited the couple's home several times

The conclusion was that a couples counselor would be the key to stopping the
ghostly activity
Poltergeist is German for mean ghosts
The wife was always present in the home when the events occurred
The poltergeist symptoms occurred in Nevada
Mary Jones preacher vignette
Improved instrumentation can measure major energy vortices around the planet
The Daily Mail described how three nuns and numerous other witnesses saw a
ball of fire
Because the scientists found significant energy levels, the light must have been
the result of geological influences
The religious revival in Egryn, Wales occurred in 1905
American scientists have renewed interest in the event
The psychic/detective vignette
According to the psychic the victim was located south of the city
The investigation of the homicide was in New York
The psychic's clues lead to discovering the body
The psychic worked with the police department for two years
The victim was stabbed
Spoon bending vignette
The panel also inspected the spoon
The panel first saw the televised performance on video
The panel of experts gathered in Geneva
The panel unanimously determined that Zolinyat had psychokinetic abilities
The panel determined that the spoon was fake
Dream precognition vignette
In lucid dreaming, dreamers have no control of their dreams
Mark Twain's brother was killed in a plane crash
Stowell presently explores the possibility of precognition in lucid dreaming
The lack of associations found provided no support for the existence of dream
precognition
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Stowell published four articles
Channeling vignette
The name of John Edward's television show is Crossing Over.
Modern interest in channeling was spurred by actress Meryl Streep
John Edward uses audience members as a medium for the afterlife-relatives of
audience members
Scientific evaluation of his performances has revealed evidence that channeling
occurs during Edward's show.
The purpose of channeling is for spiritual entities to send messages by taking
over the minds and bodies of mediums
Milk miracle vignette
The stone statue consumed milk from an urn
Ganeshji is a Moslem statue
The evidence provided can be interpreted as reason to believe that the milk
miracle was not authentic
Ganeshji drank milk for 24 days
The miracle milk occurred in Delhi, India
Astrology vignette
McNaughtry discusses the role that astrology played in the Vatican
The author's book appeared on the latest Los Angeles Times Top 10 Bestseller's list
The book begins the historical journey with Copernicus
The author provides evidence that dispels claims of predicting future events
from astrological data
McNaughtry's book was fiction
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Approval Date: 10/2/08
The Psychology Departmental Review Committee, a subcommittee of the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research, reviewed and
approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in Federal Regulations 45 CFR
46, Subsection 101 (b).
Approval is granted to conduct the project as described in your protocol. Changes in your
protocol must be submitted to this committee for review and approval prior to their
implementation.
The protection of human subjects in your study is an ongoing process for which you hold
primary responsibility. In receiving approval for your protocol, you agree to conduct the
project in accordance with the ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human
subjects in research, as described in the Belmont Report. The full text of the Belmont
Report is available on the Office of Sponsored Research (OSR) webpage at
http: //www.hhs.Qov/ohrD/humansubiects/quidance/belmont. htm or by request from the
OSR.
There is no obligation for you to provide a report to this committee upon project completion
unless you experience any unusual or unanticipated results with regard to the participation
of human subjects. Please report such events to this office promptly as they occur.
If you have questions or concerns about your project or this approval, please feel free to
contact a member of the Psychology Departmental Review Committee.
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